Towards \u27Flags of Convenience\u27 in Space? by von der Dunk, Frans G.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law
Program Faculty Publications Law, College of
3-2012
Towards 'Flags of Convenience' in Space?
Frans G. von der Dunk
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, fvonderdunk2@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.




©2012 Frans G. von der Dunk. 
* Harvey & Susan Perlman Alumni / Othmer Professor of Space Law, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, College of Law, LL.M. Programme in Space, Cyber and Telecommunications Law; 
fvonderdunk2@unl.edu. 
 
Towards ‘flags of convenience’ in space? 
Frans G. von der Dunk* 
  
1. ‘Flags of convenience’ and ‘genuine link’ in the law of the (high) seas 
The term ‘flags of convenience’ by now has some history behind it, if it has not indeed 
gained some notoriety. This means that it is important to realise where it comes from and 
how it was developed in a legal context in order to separate the proper legal parameters, 
of (potential) relevance for space law and the present discussions, from the more 
colloquial aspects of the notion. 
The background of the concept lies in the law of the sea. Since days of old, ships hoisted 
the flags of the nations they (or at least their owners, if private) belonged to. Ships 
without any national flag as a matter of fact soon came to be considered as being without 
nationality, an anomaly without any state either willing or entitled to exercise jurisdiction 
over them often effectively equating them to pirate ships – and ships hoisting the flags of 
two different nations were in turn equated to ships without nationality.1 
These general customs over time consolidated, and in the end were codified into treaty 
law: in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas it was declared that “[s]hips have 
the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly”2. As part of its sovereignty, 
moreover, every state had the right to have its ships fly its flags.3 
In sum, the registration of a ship was concurrent to providing it with the flag and 
nationality of the state of registration, such registration was a sovereign right of a state 
and as a consequence that state was entitled to apply its jurisdiction on a quasi-territorial 
basis to that ship.4 ‘Quasi-territorial’, since a ship was not true territory legally speaking, 
and for example when present in the territorial waters or ports of a state different from the 
state of registration, the true territorial jurisdiction of the latter state would usually 
override the quasi-territorial jurisdiction of the registration state.5 The latter jurisdiction 
was applied for a range of purposes, including the implementation of domestic criminal 
law, but also with respect to safety requirements, including crew licenses and craft 
certification, and employment conditions. 
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas at the same time represented a first effort to deal 
with the increasing phenomenon of shipping companies registering their ships not with 
their home state properly speaking, but with states where the registration costs, safety 
requirements and/or employment conditions were favourable to those shipping companies 
– meaning generally they remained at a low level. In other words, such companies went 
                                                
1. Cf. already Art. 6, Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, done 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 
September 1962; 450 UNTS 82; TIAS 5200; 13 UST 2312; UKTS 1963 No. 5; Cmnd. 584; ATS 1963 No. 
12; and Art. 92, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, done 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994; 1833 UNTS 3 & 1835 UNTS 261; UKTS 1999 No. 81; Cmnd. 8941; 
ATS 1994 No. 31; 21 ILM 1261 (1982); S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39. 
2. Art. 5(1), Convention on the High Seas.  
3. See Art. 4, 5(1), Convention on the High Seas.  
4. Cf. Art. 6(1), Convention on the High Seas; Art. 92(1), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
5. Cf. e.g. Art. 1(1), Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, done 29 April 
1958, entered into force 10 September 1964; 516 UNTS 205; TIAS 5639; UKTS 1965 No. 3; Cmd. 584; 
ATS 1963 No. 12, juncto Artt. 14-20, setting out the regime for ‘innocent passage’. 
von der Dunk in IISL-ECSL Symposium, Vienna (March 2012). 
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‘license shopping’, looking for the lowest-level obligations and associated costs. Some 
states, consequently, though in general terms not major economic powers even 
specifically from a maritime perspective, turned out to be amongst the largest shipping 
nations in the world due to such registration practices. 
These were the so-called ‘flags of convenience’, ‘cheap flags’ where the usually 
concurrent presence of lower standards in terms of cheap and less-trained labour and the 
lack of high-level safety standards for ships and operations became an increasing ground 
for concern amongst the other shipping and coastal states.  
Whilst the sovereign right of individual states to determine the conditions under which 
ships could be included in its national register had to be recognised also by the 1958 
Convention,6 the latter did represent an effort to address the issue by requiring national 
registration of ships to take place only in case these had a ‘genuine link’ with the state 
concerned. Thus, Article 5(1) expressly commanded that “[t]here must exist a genuine 
link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying 
its flag”.  
More in particular,  
“1. Every State shall take such measures for ships under its flag as are necessary to 
ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:  
(a) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention 
of collisions;  
(b) The manning of ships and labour conditions for crews taking into account 
the applicable international labour instruments;  
 (c) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships.  
2. In taking such measures each State is required to conform to generally accepted 
international standards and to take any steps which may be necessary to ensure their 
observance.”7  
Thus, in the absence of political feasibility to derogate by way of an international treaty 
from the sovereign right of a state to determine registration conditions, by listing some 
key parameters on the international level and requiring states to abide by them it was 
hoped that the genuine link would translate into genuine concern for the well-being of the 
ship, the crew and the cargo, as well as for others possibly harmed by their operations, 
and hence would translate into the effective exercise of jurisdiction and control by way of 
serious and high-level requirements being imposed upon them and enforced as 
appropriate. 
As time progressed the use of ‘flags of convenience’ and the number of incidents and 
accidents as a consequence of lower safety-standards, including ever more prominently 
also environmental disasters, grew considerably, so the relevant international legal 
obligations tried to counteract this by raising the bar for national registration. When the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, developing an overarching regime for all 
international maritime matters and superseding inter alia the 1958 Convention on the 
High Seas, incorporated its clause on the ‘genuine link’,8 it added quite some detail to it: 
                                                
6. Thus, Art. 5(1), Convention on the High Seas, provides that “[e]ach State shall fix the conditions for the 
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag”.   
7. Art. 10, Convention on the High Seas.  
8. See Art. 91(1), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
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“1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.  
2. In particular every State shall:  
(a) maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships 
flying its flag, except those which are excluded from generally accepted 
international regulations on account of their small size; and  
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and 
its master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social 
matters concerning the ship.  
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to 
ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:  
 (a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;  
(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking 
into account the applicable international instruments;  
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention 
of collisions.  
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure: 
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate intervals, is 
surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has on board such charts, 
nautical publications and navigational equipment and instruments as are 
appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship;  
(b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess 
appropriate qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, 
communications and marine engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in 
qualification and numbers for the type, size, machinery and equipment of the 
ship;  
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully 
conversant with and required to observe the applicable international 
regulations concerning the safety of life at sea, the prevention of collisions, the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, and the maintenance of 
communications by radio.  
5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to 
conform to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices 
and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance.”9  
In addition, on specific issues such as double-hull tankers other international treaties have 
been established,10 although those treaties are by that very token only applicable to their 
respective constituencies of states parties, which excludes most of the states 
predominantly targeted as ‘flags of convenience’.  
In short: from the still considerable if not indeed growing number of accidents occurring 
specifically with ships registered with ‘flags of convenience’ it can only be concluded 
that in the international maritime area the problem persists until today. That, however, in 
itself should not be equated to concluding that legal action would altogether be useless; it 
simply cannot be measured to what extent these legal requirements attached to a ‘genuine 
link’ nationality may have avoided accidents which would have otherwise happened. 
 
                                                
9. Art. 94, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
10. Such as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973 as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL Convention as Modified), London, done 17 February 1978, entered into 
force 2 October 1983; ATS 1988, No. 29.  
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2. Moving from the high seas to outer space – the key parameters 
When trying to evaluate the extent to which, following the above overview of the law of 
the sea, ‘flags of convenience’ do actually or might possibly constitute a problematic 
issue for outer space and outer space activities, in order to see how we could learn from 
these earlier experiences, a summary assessment of the current situation in space law, in 
particular focusing on such safety- and environmental security-related issues, is due. 
The first point of note here is that, whilst space law also knows the concept of registration 
of space vehicles and even has a international treaty providing for the baseline details in 
the form of the Registration Convention11, that treaty does not provide for much by way 
of either ‘genuine link’ requirements or specific requirements addressing potential safety 
concerns: 
“1. Each State of registry shall furnish to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, as soon as practicable, the following information concerning each space 
object carried on its registry:  
 (a) Name of launching State or States; 
 (b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number;  
 (c) Date and territory or location of launch;  
 (d) Basic orbital parameters, including:  
  (i) Nodal period;  
  (ii) Inclination;  
  (iii) Apogee;  
 (iv) Perigee;  
 (e) General function of the space object.  
2. Each State of registry may, from time to time, provide the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations with additional information concerning a space object carried on 
its registry.  
3. Each State of registry shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to 
the greatest extent feasible and as soon as practicable, of space objects concerning 
which it has previously transmitted information, and which have been but no longer 
are in Earth orbit.”12  
Also, within the corpus juris spatialis internationalis there is no reference whatsoever to 
certification of spacecraft, requirements with respect to crew or the general safety of 
operations, other elements prominently involved in implementing a ‘genuine link’ 
requirement through substantial legal and factual control. The clause coming closest to 
dealing with such issues in international space law is the very general one offered by 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty:  
“States (…) shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other 
States (…) and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful 
contamination (…) and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this 
purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of 
                                                
11. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Registration Convention), 
New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15; TIAS 8480; 28 
UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43 (1975). 
12. Art. IV, Registration Convention.  
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other States (…) it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with any such activity or experiment (…)[and a state] which has reason 
to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State (…) would cause 
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation 
concerning the activity or experiment”.13 
On the domestic level, only two national space laws have provided for a generic 
requirement regarding certification of relevant technology and hardware, with details 
provided by further implementing regulations: those of Russia14 and the Ukraine15 
respectively. 
Essentially therefore, as a consequence of the above concerns with the safety of space 
activities have within the legal realm been channelled largely through the handling of 
liability issues. It is by assessing how third-party liability has been handled in space law 
that we can determine the extent to which ‘flags of convenience’ may present a real threat 
in the space arena. As a consequence, such liability issues will also provide the 
fundamental elements of analysing the licensing of private operators from a perspective 
of addressing ‘flags of convenience’ in the space law context, as a key area where states 
might be tempted to offer ‘cheap flags’. 
These issues of liability, further to the generic clause of Article VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty, were handled at the international level essentially by the Liability Convention16. 
The Liability Convention most importantly holds states liable for damage also if actually 
caused by private activities through the fundamental involvement of such states in the 
launch of the space object causing the damage in question, as per the concept of the 
“launching State”17. Such liability is, furthermore, in principle without limit.18 
As the principled upshot of this state liability – which is in general contrast to private 
liability of ship owners for liability for damage caused by their ships, where only for 
exceptional circumstances treaty law has been developed providing for second-tier 
                                                
13. See Art. IX, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), 
London/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; 
TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967).  
14. Cf. Art. 10, Law of the Russian Federation on Space Activities (hereafter Russian Law on Space 
Activities), No. 5663-1, 20 August 1993, effective 6 October 1993; National Space Legislation of the 
World, Vol. I (2001), at 101.  
15. Cf. Art. 12, Law of the Ukraine on Space Activities (hereafter Ukrainian Law on Space Activities), No. 
502/96-VR, 15 November 1996; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 36.  
16. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter Liability 
Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972; 
961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975 No. 5; 10 ILM 
965 (1971).  
17. Art. I(c), Liability Convention, provides for a fourfold alternative definition of the launching state, as 
comprising “(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A State from whose 
territory or facility a space object is launched”; see further Artt. II-V. 
18. Art. XII, Liability Convention, provides: “The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to 
pay for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international law and the 
principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore 
the person, natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to 
the condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.” 
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liability of states19 – the states who are involved in the launch or procurement of the 
launch of a space object with key involvement of private operators or have their territory 
or facilities used for such a launch20 should arrange for a (legal) system of national 
derogation vis-à-vis such private operators, if they are not to be caught between an 
international obligation to pay damage and the inability to recoup any part of such 
payment from a private operator actually responsible for the accident at issue.  
Once they would choose to do so, they are actually left with various policy choices – and 
this is notably where, at least in theory, the issues of ‘flags of convenience’ and ‘license 
shopping’ come into the picture. The first major policy choice regards the level of 
mandatory reimbursement properly speaking: should it be unlimited, to mirror the 
unlimited liability under the Liability Convention which the launching state(s) would face 
(in which case there would be a huge disincentive for private parties to become involved 
in space activities at all) or should there be a cap on such reimbursement (in which case 
the state concerned would de facto act as partial insurer, namely for any amount of 
damage above the cap for which it would be held internationally liable)? 
The follow-on major policy choice would then focus on insurance for such derogation of 
international third-party liability claims of the private operators concerned. Should such 
insurance be statutorily obliged – and if so, if the reimbursement would be capped, to the 
same limit, or if reimbursement would not be capped, to a limit nevertheless? Or should it 
be left to the operator concerned, which meant allowing it ‘to bet the company’ – and 
allowing for a risk that the state would not be reimbursed in applicable cases as much as 
it might have expected? 
Finally, a more overarching third policy choice will be briefly addressed here – that of the 
question to whom, or more precisely to which categories of space activities in particular 
in terms of who undertakes them, the licensing regime developed in elaboration (amongst 
others) of the policies once chosen further to the above will be made to apply, either 
automatically or optionally. 
The main question then, with a view to determining the seriousness of the issue of ‘flags 
of convenience’ in outer space, of course is to what extent divergences have actually 
arisen as between various states potentially qualifying as ‘launching states’ of space 
objects for international third-party liability purposes. The brief analysis hereunder of 
necessity focuses only on those states which have enunciated more or less dedicated legal 
laws and acts on private operators involved in space activities, not on general licensing 
and/or tort liability regimes which might occasionally have a bearing on such issues as 
well (in particular if the state at issue has no proper national space law in place). Yet, 
already this brief analysis highlights that indeed the various states concerned have 
addressed these issues and policy choices in various manners. 
 
3. The reimbursement obligation – cap or no cap? 
Thus, on the first policy issue, the United States – the largest constituency for private 
space operators – since 1984 has capped the reimbursement obligation for licensees 
through a complicated system whereby every license will refer to such a cap as being 
                                                
19. Cf. e.g. the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, done 29 
November 1969, entered into force 19 June 1975; 973 UNTS 3; UKTS 1975 No. 106; Cmnd. 4403; ATS 
1984 No. 3; 9 ILM 45 (1970); 64 AJIL 481 (1970).  
20. Cf. again the fourfold definition of the “launching State”, supra, n. 17. 
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either the Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) calculated through a complex analysis, or the 
highest rate which can be insured against reasonable rates at the time of licensing, or US$ 
500,000,000 – whichever is the lowest of the three.21 In actual fact, the highest cap 
quoted in a license in this respect so far appears to have been US$ 261,000,000 for a 
Delta 4-M or M+ launch.22  
Australia has adopted a similar approach based on an MPL-calculation, with a ‘maximum 
maximum’ of reimbursement set at A$ 750,000,000 – roughly US$ 800,000,000 at 
today’s rates.23 For France, the recent Law on Space Operations as further elaborated by 
a Finance Act of 2008 calls for reimbursement obligations of between € 50,000,000 and € 
70,000,000 per launch to be included24, with Arianespace – the only entity so far licensed 
with a view to liability – actually having been made liable at a rate of € 60,000,000 per 
launch, some US$ 80,000,000 as of today25. Austria, in its even more recent Outer Space 
Act, applies a cap on reimbursement of – at minimum – the same € 60,000,000.26 Finally, 
also South Korea applies a maximum to the reimbursement obligation, of 
200,000,000,000 Won – roughly US$ 175,000,000 as of the time of writing.27 
Other states by contrast have just referred to the possibility, under the applicable 
domestic statute, to limit the reimbursement obligation, at various levels of specificity 
and without any indication as to actual amounts to be quoted in particular licenses. The 
Swedish national act simply speaks of reimbursement of the state of whatever 
international claim it would have to settle “unless special reasons tell against this”.28 For 
the United Kingdom, “[a] person to whom this Act applies shall indemnify Her Majesty’s 
                                                
21. See Sec. 70112, Commercial Space Transportation – Commercial Space Launch Activities (hereafter US 
Commercial Space Launch Act), 49 U.S.C. 70101 (1994).  
22. See Study of the Liability Risk-Sharing Regime in the United States for Commercial Space 
Transportation, of 1 August 2006, conducted for the US DoT, Aerospace Report No. ATR-2006(5266)-1, at 
p. 1, fn. 4. 
23. See Secc. 47, 48, An act about space activities, and for related purposes (hereafter Australian Space 
Activities Act), No. 123 of 1998, assented to 21 December 1998; National Space Legislation of the World, 
Vol. I (2001), at 197, as amended by the Space Activities Amendment Act, An Act to amend the Space 
Activities Act 1998, No. 100 of 2002, assented to 10 November 2002; 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/saaa2002247/.  
24. See Artt. 13-17, Law on Space Operations (Loi relative aux opérations spatiales; hereafter French Law 
on Space Operations); Loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008; unofficial English version 34 Journal of Space Law 
(2008), 453, juncto Art. 119, Finance Act (Loi de finances), Loi n° 2008-1443 du 30 décembre 2008 de 
finances rectificative pour 2008. 
25. This was a ‘translation’ from the pre-euro period, when the maximum reimbursement was set at FF 
400,000,000 – the rough equivalent of € 60,000,000 at the time of introduction of the euro. See Artt. 3(9), 
4(1), Declaration by Certain European Governments Relating to the Ariane Launcher Production Phase, done 
14 January 1980, entered into force 15 October 1981; 6 Annals of Air and Space Law (1981), 723.  
26. See §§ 4(4), 11, Austrian Federal Law on the Authorisation of Space Activities and the Establishment of a 
National Space Registry (hereafter Austrian Outer Space Act), as adopted by Parliament on 6 December 2011. 
27. See Art. 14, Space Development Promotion Act (hereafter Korean Space Development Promotion Act), 
promulgated 31 May 2005, entered into force 1 December 2005; unofficial translation 33 Journal of Space 
Law (2007), 175; juncto Art. 5, Space Liability Act, Law No. 8852, of 21 December 2007; UNOOSA 
National Space Law Database, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosaddb/showDocument.do?documentUid=402&level2=none&node=ROK1
970&level1=countries&cmd=add. 
28. Sec. 6, Act on Space Activities (hereafter Swedish Act on Space Activities), 1982: 963, 18 November 
1982; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 398; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, 
E.II.1; 36 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), 11.  
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government in the United Kingdom against any claims brought against the government in 
respect of damage or loss arising out of activities carried on by him to which this Act 
applies”;29 Hong Kong’s Ordinance contains an almost identical clause.30 
The Russian Law on Space Activities more or less implicitly leaves the possibility open 
to limit liability payments from the licensees to the state,31 as do the Ukrainian Law32 and 
the Brazilian Administrative Edict33, all however without any clear-cut reference to the 
underlying international liability obligations. In the case of South Africa, by contrast, it is 
expressly provided that a licence issued “may (…) contain conditions relating to (…) 
liability of the licensee resulting from international conventions, treaties and agreements 
entered into or ratified by the Government of the Republic”, including such which “may 
determine, limit or exclude the liability of the licensee concerned regarding damages that 
may be caused”.34 Similarly, in Belgium35 and the Netherlands36 the options to limit such 
liability reimbursement are clearly left open.  
Finally, the Norwegian Act on launching objects from Norwegian territory into outer 
space37 does not speak to the issue at all – but that is primarily because it was enunciated 
as early as 1969, well before the Liability Convention was being finalised whereas the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty by way of Article VII only posited the general principle of 
liability without providing for any further details. 
 
4. Insurance against third-party liability and reimbursement: obligatory or not? 
Also on the second policy issue, of insurance, the statutory approaches vary. The national 
acts of Norway and Sweden do not even refer to ‘insurance’, whereby it must be deemed 
to be at the discretion of the licensee to take out such an insurance – although for example 
the Swedish act states that “[a] licence may be restricted in the way deemed appropriate 
with regard to the circumstances”, which could of course result in an insurance obligation 
                                                
29. Sec. 10(1), Outer Space Act (hereafter UK Outer Space Act), 18 July 1986, 1986 Chapter 38; National 
Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 293; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.I; 36 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), 12.  
30. See Sec. 12(1), Outer Space Ordinance, An Ordinance to confer licensing and other powers on the Chief 
Executive to secure compliance with the international obligations of the People’s Republic of China with 
respect to the launching and operation of space objects and the carrying on of other activities in outer space 
(hereafter Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance), 13 June 1997, as amended 1999, Chapter 523; National 
Space Legislation of the World, Vol. II (2002), at 403; 51 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (2002), 
50. 
31. Cf. Art. 30, Russian Law on Space Activities.  
32. Cf. Art. 25, Ukrainian Law on Space Activities.  
33. Cf. Art. 9, Administrative Edict No. 27 (hereafter Brazilian Administrative Edict), 20 June 2001; 
National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. II (2002), at 377.  
34. Sec. 14(1), resp. (2), Space Affairs Act (hereafter South African Space Affairs Act), 6 September 1993, 
assented to on 23 June 1993, No. 84 of 1993; Statutes of the Republic of South Africa – Trade and 
Industry, Issue No. 27, 21-44; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 413. 
35. See Art. 15, Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Guidance of Space Objects 
(hereafter Belgian Space Law), 17 September 2005, adopted 28 June 2005; Nationales Weltraumrecht / 
National Space Law (2008), at 183. 
36. See Sec. 12, Law Incorporating Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry 
of Space Objects (hereafter Dutch Space Law), 24 January 2007; 80 Staatsblad (2007), at 1; Nationales 
Weltraumrecht / National Space Law (2008), at 201.  
37. Act on launching objects from Norwegian territory into outer space (hereafter Norwegian Act on 
Launching), No. 38, 13 June 1969; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 286.  
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in the license itself.38 Also South Africa39 and Belgium40 do not statutorily require the 
licensee to take out insurance (let alone refer to a cap in this respect) – although of course 
on a license-by-license basis that could be the result, as moreover justified by some more 
general principles made to apply to licenses and licensees. 
In the United Kingdom, though insurance strictly speaking is not obligatory under the 
statute41 (with the Hong Kong Ordinance containing an identical clause42), at the policy 
level this has been standard practice so as to effectively constitute an obligation, with 
moreover a standard cap on third-party liability insurance being applied of (currently) 
some € 60,000,000, some US$ 80,000,000 at today’s rates.43  
In the cases of Russia44, the Ukraine45 and Brazil46, the national space laws, all presuming 
unlimited reimbursement at least as a starting point for any particular license 
‘negotiations’, provide for an obligation to insure against such third-party liability 
derogation in respect of which they, however, then proceed on the basis of an opposite 
presumption: that the insurance will be capped47.  
In all those cases, the respective governments apparently are willing to run the risk that 
their unlimited right of recourse vis-à-vis the licensee might in cases of catastrophic 
disasters falling within the scope of the Liability Convention not result in full 
reimbursement, as beyond the cap of obligatory insurance it depends on the 
circumstances to what extent the licensee might still be able to reimburse. 
That is different again for the remainder of national space laws at issue. Although also in 
Australia48, the United States49, South Korea50, France51, the Netherlands52 and Austria53 
insurance for third-party liability is obligatory, here the insurance cap is equivalent to the 
cap on the applicable reimbursement obligations, most relevant clauses actually 
addressing the two elements together. 
                                                
38. Sec. 3, Swedish Act on Space Activities.  
39. Cf. Sec. 11(2), South African Space Affairs Act, referring inter alia to “(b) the national interests of the 
Republic; and (c) the international obligations and responsibilities of the Republic”. 
40. Cf. Art. 5(2), Belgian Space Law, providing that “[t]he Minister (…) may in particular (…) create an 
obligation for insurance to be taken out in favour of third parties to cover the damage that may result from 
the activities authorised by him”, emphasis added. 
41. Cf. Sec. 5(2)(f), UK Outer Space Act, providing: “A licence may in particular contain conditions (…) 
requiring the licensee to insure himself against liability incurred in respect of damage or loss suffered by 
third parties, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, as a result of the activities authorised by the licence”; 
emphasis added. 
42. See Sec. 6(2)(f), Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance.  
43. Cf. the UK Space Agency’s statement on the issue, at http://www.bis.gov.uk/ukspaceagency/what-we-
do/space-and-the-growth-agenda/uk-capabilities-for-overseas-markets/the-outer-space-act-1986. Earlier 
policy statements referred to an amount of £ 100,000,000, almost double the present applicable amount; see 
the 2010 Revised Guidance For Applicants Outer Space Act 1986, p. 2, at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/ukspaceagency/docs/osa/guiforapp2010.pdf. 
44. See Art. 25, esp. (1), Russian Law on Space Activities.  
45. See Art. 24, Ukrainian Law on Space Activities.  
46. See Art. 9, Brazilian Administrative Edict.  
47. No indication however is given of the size of the cap, or even of any methodology for calculating it.  
48. Cf. e.g. Sec. 69(3), Australian Space Activities Act, as far as the launch permit is concerned.  
49. See Sec. 70112, US Commercial Space Launch Act.  
50. Cf. Artt. 14, 15, Korean Space Development Promotion Act. 
51. See Art. 6, juncto Artt. 13-17, French Law on Space Operations. 
52. See Secc. 3(4), 12, Dutch Space Law.  
53. See §§ 4(7), 11, Austrian Outer Space Act. 
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5. Scoping the licensing requirement: territorial, personal or otherwise? 
A third, more general policy issue relates to the scope of the licensing requirement 
ratione personae oc territoriae, and the attendant reimbursement and insurance 
obligations – upon whom is the state concerned going to impose these requirements and 
obligations? In the absence of any clear guidance on what “national activities in outer 
space (…) carried on (…) by non-governmental entities” means so as to require 
“authorization and continuing supervision” by the states concerned,54 individual states 
have picked their own approach regarding how to scope their licensing regimes. 
The relevant acts of the United Kingdom55 and Hong Kong56 apply the respective 
requirement to obtain a license, including notably the reimbursement- and insurance-
related obligations discussed above, to nationals only. It may be noted here, that of course 
the nationality of natural or juridical persons undertaking certain activities represents one 
of the universally-recognised bases for the exercise of jurisdiction by a particular state – 
this is the so-called ‘personal jurisdiction’. 
By contrast, under the Australian national act, a launch permit (or exemption certificate), 
authorisation or space license are required for, respectively, launching from Australian 
territory or returning to Australia of a space object launched from Australia, return of 
Australia of a space object launched outside of Australia, or operating a launch facility in 
Australia.57 Like Australia, the national licensing regime established by Brazil under its 
Administrative Edict deals with launching activities only – and in the same fashion as 
Australia, it applies that regime only to “launching activities on Brazilian territory”.58 
It may be noted, of course, that the so-called ‘territorial jurisdiction’, the right of a 
sovereign state to rule over activities conducted on or from its territory, presents the other 
universally-recognised basis for exercising jurisdiction. It should further be noted, that for 
launch activities in particular the exercise of territorial jurisdiction is appropriate, in that 
the most unequivocal and undisputed criterion for becoming a launching state under the 
Liability Convention is that of use of the state’s territory for the launch at issue.59 
In the case of Sweden60, Russia61, and the Ukraine62 both territorial and personal 
jurisdiction are applied in determining the principled scope of the act – and applied in a 
principled manned to all kinds of space activities, not just to launchings. In the latter two 
                                                
54. Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty; emphasis added. 
55. See Sec. 2(1), UK Outer Space Act; Sec. 2(2) defines “United Kingdom national” for the purpose, 
whereas Sec. 2(3) allows for extension of application of the Act to legal entities incorporated in the 
Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and other dependent territories. 
56. See Sec. 5(1), Hong Kong Outer Space Ordinance, allowing the Hong Kong authorities to “grant a 
licence in respect of activities to which this Ordinance applies to a body corporate incorporated under the 
laws of Hong Kong”. 
57. See, resp., Secc. 12-13, 14, 15, Australian Space Activities Act.  
58. Art. 2, Brazilian Administrative Edict.  
59. See Art. I(c), sub (ii), Liability Convention.  
60. See Sec. 2, Swedish Act on Space Activities.  
61. See Art. 1(1), Russian Law on Space Activities. As further corroborated by other relevant clauses in the 
Law such as in Artt. 3-6, the phrase “space activities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation” 
comprises both territorial and personal jurisdiction. 
62. See Art. 10, Ukrainian Law on Space Activities: “[a]ny subjects of space activity which carry out or 
intend to carry out such activity in the Ukraine or, under jurisdiction of the Ukraine, abroad should obtain 
license in the National Space Agency of the Ukraine for the rights to carry out such activity”. 
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cases, in addition the respective licensing regimes are applied to space objects duly 
registered with the two governments, in the case of Russia explicitly,63 in the case of the 
Ukraine as implied by the use of the term “jurisdiction”.64 
Other countries have still more sophisticated (or complicated, depending upon one’s 
perspective) approaches to applying their licensing obligations, for example for the 
purpose of taking into account the possibility that particular space activities targeted by 
their national space laws may already be subject to licensing obligations imposed by 
other states.  
Focusing on launching only along the lines of Australia and Brazil, South Korea has thus 
imposed its licensing regime on any launch activity conducted on its territory or facilities 
otherwise under its jurisdiction, and in addition any launch activity elsewhere involving 
“a launch vehicle owned by the Government or a national of the Republic of Korea”.65 
This applies also to the Norwegian regime, where firstly territorial jurisdiction is 
extended on a quasi-territorial basis to “Norwegian vessels, aircrafts etc.”, and secondly 
may be applied in “[a]reas that are not subject to the sovereignty of any state, when the 
launching is undertaken by a Norwegian citizen or person with habitual residence in 
Norway” – in other words, on the basis of territorial and quasi-territorial, and 
occasionally personal jurisdiction.66 
Belgium and the Netherlands apply similar approaches, covering territorial activities in 
full and activities by nationals in certain circumstances only – but then to all space 
activities, not just launching. In addition to applying a territorial and quasi-territorial 
approach in a comprehensive manner the Belgian space law states: “[w]hen provided for 
under an international agreement, this law may apply to the activities referred to under 
indent 1 and carried out by natural or legal persons of Belgian nationality, irrespective of 
the location where such activities are carried out”.67  
The Dutch space law in turn, while ipso facto obliging a license for those operating “in or 
from within the Netherlands or else on or from a Dutch ship or Dutch aircraft”, allows 
such obligations to be extended by specific regulation to “(a) designated space activities 
that are performed by a Dutch natural or juridical person on or from the territory of a 
State that is not party to the Outer Space Treaty or on or from a ship or aircraft that falls 
under the jurisdiction of a State that is not party to the Outer Space Treaty; (b) the 
organization of outer-space activities by a natural or juridical person from within the 
Netherlands”.68 
Finally, whilst also applying the licensing obligation to all space activities, three states in 
doing so at a second level then nevertheless make a fundamental distinction between 
launching and other space activities. The United States does so even by way of three 
distinct sets of regulation, two of which (excluding the regime handling commercial 
satellite communications) have only recently been consolidated in one Title of the United 
States Code.69  
                                                
63. See Art. 17(2), Russian Law on Space Activities. 
64. Cf. Art. 10, Ukrainian Law on Space Activities. 
65. Art. 11(1)(b), Korean Space Development Promotion Act.  
66. Sec. 1(b), resp. (c), Norwegian Act on Launching. 
67. Art. 2(2), Belgian Space Law; “indent 1” refers to “the activities of launching, flight operations and 
guidance of space objects”. 
68. Sec. 2(1), resp. (2), Dutch Space Law.  
69. This is Title 51 – National and Commercial Space Programs. 
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The US Commercial Space Launch Act as amended applies to launches conducted from 
US territory, from elsewhere by US nationals as defined, as well as by US nationals 
“outside the United States and outside the territory of a foreign country unless there is an 
agreement between the United States Government and the government of the foreign 
country providing that the government of the foreign country has jurisdiction over the 
launch or operation or reentry”, alternatively “in the territory of a foreign country if there 
is an agreement between the United States Government and the government of the 
foreign country providing that the United States Government has jurisdiction over the 
launch or operation or reentry”.70 
As for communications, the 1934 Communications Act provided for a licensing 
obligation for anyone intending to “use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of 
energy or communications or signals by radio” from anywhere in the United States, 
including from “any vessel or aircraft of the United States (…) or (…) any other mobile 
stations within the jurisdiction of the United States”.71 This act was formally declared 
applicable to satellite communications in 1970.72 In other words: territorial and quasi-
territorial jurisdiction applies to private communications activities, including if using 
satellites, but no personal jurisdiction as such.73 
The third area of space activities specifically regulated by the United States for the 
purpose of private commercial involvement, that of satellite remote sensing, saw the 1984 
Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act being replaced by the 1992 Land Remote 
Sensing Policy Act. Both Acts, however, applied to the same sets of private remote 
sensing activities, namely all those undertaken by persons “subject to the jurisdiction or 
control of the United States”.74 Thus, different from satellite communications, both 
territorial and personal jurisdiction of the United States are applied here,75 whereas the 
reference to “control” in addition has been explained to refer to fundamental connections 
of the activities at issue with the United States, such as the use of US launchers or US 
ground stations, or substantial data marketing activities in the United States. 
South Africa and France in their national space acts take a more simply bifurcated 
approach, addressing launching – partly in view of its liability implications under the 
Liability Convention – as separate from all other space activities in terms of the extent to 
which jurisdiction is exercised for the purpose of licensing.  
As to the South African act, it provides that those interested in undertaking launch 
activities “from the territory of the Republic” or “from the territory of another state by or 
on behalf of a juristic person incorporated or registered in the Republic” require a license 
– in other words, those falling within either the territorial or the personal jurisdiction (or 
                                                
70. Sec. 70104(a)(3), resp. (4), US Commercial Space Launch Act; now codified as Subtitle VII of 51 
U.S.C. 
71. Sec. 301, Communications Act, 19 June 1934; 47 U.S.C. 151 (1988); 48 Stat. 1064.  
72. As per Communications Satellite Facilities, First Report and Order, 22 FCC 2d 86 (1970), Appendix C, 
p. 1.  
73. Viewed in context, the reference to ‘jurisdiction’ here should be deemed to refer to ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ only. 
74. Sec. 402(a), Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act, Public Law 98-365, 98th Congress, H.R. 
5155, 17 July 1984; 98 Stat. 451; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.III.4; resp. Sec. 5622(a), Land 
Remote Sensing Policy Act, Public Law 102-555, 102nd Congress, H.R. 6133, 28 October 1992; 15 U.S.C. 
5601; 106 Stat. 4163. Now codified as Subtitle VI of 51 U.S.C. 
75. Viewed in context, here the reference to ‘jurisdiction’ should be deemed to refer to both ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ and ‘personal jurisdiction’. 
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both) of the Republic of South Africa.76 By contrast, only “the participation by any 
juristic person incorporated or registered in the Republic, in space activities - (i) 
entailing obligations to the State in terms of international conventions, treaties or 
agreements entered into or ratified by the Government of the Republic; or (ii) which may 
affect national interests” requires a license under the Act77 – albeit that a safety clause 
could potentially extend this obligation also to foreign entities undertaking such activities 
from South African territory.78 
As for France, lastly, with respect to launch activities the national law provides that any 
operator, whatever its nationality, who wants to proceed with launch activities from 
French soil as well as any French operator to undertake such activities from elsewhere 
require the authorisation prescribed.79 The additional reference to means or facilities 
falling under French jurisdiction furthermore stretches the applicability of jurisdiction so 
as to also include quasi-territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the procurement of the 
launch of a space object or activities with any such object in outer space, such an 
authorisation is prescribed only for natural and juridical persons of French nationality.80 
 
6. ‘Flags of convenience’ in space law: is there a need for action? 
The above analyses have demonstrated that the dozen or so existing national space laws 
handling private involvement in space activities, notably their liability- and insurance-
related consequences, have so far done so in varying fashion. To start with in theory, that 
might lead to certain (prospective) operators making a rather judicious choice regarding 
which regime they might wish to be licensed under, as presenting them with the least-
costly set of obligations, requirements and standards – in other words, seeking a ‘flag of 
convenience’ to operate under. 
This would assume of course, that such operators would not even prefer to operate from 
jurisdictions – including in terms of registration and headquartering, read nationality, of 
the actually operating company – where as of yet no licensing system has been developed 
specifically for private space activities, and hence no dedicated reimbursement or 
insurance obligations exist.  
Whilst, however, prima facie that might seem to be an attractive option, any operator 
following such route should realise that, if causing damage covered by the Liability 
Convention and their government being consequently responsible and/or liable at the 
international level, such a government would in view of the specifics of the space sector 
and the likely enormous damages involved try to use every legal tool (such as general tort 
law, due diligence or wrongful act concepts) at its disposal to have international claims 
reimbursed after all – without any of the legal transparency and clarity that a license 
would have provided. 
Of course, from the mere fact that national laws and licensing regimes are different it can 
not automatically be concluded that there is a risk in practice for ‘flags of convenience’ in 
outer space to become a real problem, so as to require or justify substantial efforts to deal 
with it for example at the UN level.  
                                                
76. Sec. 11(1)(a), resp. (b), South African Space Affairs Act.  
77. Sec. 11(1)(d), South African Space Affairs Act; emphasis added.  
78. See Sec. 11(1)(e), referring to “any other space or space-related activities prescribed by the Minister”.  
79. See Art. 2(1), resp. (2), French Law on Space Operations. 
80. See Art. 2(3), French Law on Space Operations.  
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Firstly, the fact that – different from ships – space objects launched on the register of one 
state would be likely first and most of all to harm the state of launch would contradict 
such a conclusion, as this would seem to present a powerful incentive – much more so 
than with maritime activities – for states serving as registration states to make sure 
themselves that appropriate safety and other relevant standards and requirements will be 
applied. Labour standards from such a perspective definitively form part of such 
requirements, in view of the highly-technical nature of most, if not indeed all, space 
activities. 
Secondly, the practice at the national level seems to be relatively coherent in terms of 
especially the liability-reimbursement issue, presumably the most visible and certainly 
the most quantifiable one. Whilst some states do indeed cap reimbursement, they would 
seem to do so at roughly comparable levels (in particular within Europe, with the figure 
of € 60,000,000 figuring prominently), and whilst other states proceed on the assumption 
of unlimited reimbursement, most of those do have options either statutorily defined or de 
facto available in individual licenses to provide for caps on reimbursement. It would 
require more extended analysis of licenses granted under those regimes before a final 
answer could be provided here, but the general framework character of those national 
space laws allows for sufficient flexibility from this perspective to make it difficult to 
arrive at any conclusion that some of these laws are very fundamentally and critically at 
odds with others. 
Thirdly, in a sense the international liability issues in space law have been taken care of 
in a manner likely to – again – provide incentives to relevant states to be much more 
careful before serving as (cheap) launching and registration states81 than in the maritime 
context. The ‘beauty’ of the Liability Convention from this perspective lies in the 
comprehensive system of state liability for privately caused damage, which makes it a 
problem for the launching state(s) rather than the victims if private operators are not 
made subject to licensing requirements with a certain rigorousness to them. The 
temptation to become a ‘flag of convenience’ might well be checked by these inherent 
self-interests in the safety of space activities conducted under one’s aegis. 
On the other hand, at a second level more divergence can be discerned which could 
eventually lead to a distorting impact on the space sector. As long as damage caused by 
and/or to space activities remains a rather unique event, the lack of standard obligations 
to insurance may not be too bothersome – in particular in view of the aforementioned 
beauty of the Liability Convention, guaranteeing to victims that the deepest pockets of 
the states would be available for compensating their damage. Once that, however, would 
start to change – for instance as a consequence of the infamous cascade effect in terms of 
space debris – it may lead to some states being surprised by a huge claim not easily 
recoverable from the actual perpetrator, even if licensed and under an obligation to 
reimburse. 
Also the increasing possibilities to launch from different territories and facilities than the 
national one – still leading to liability under the Liability Convention! – may raise the risk 
of safety arrangements somehow falling in between the cracks. Although ultimately 
appropriately taken care of primarily through US licensing, the case of Sea Launch, 
                                                
81. It should of course be noted that the registration state of a space object is by definition the launching 
state of that space object or one of the launching states, in case more than one state qualifies as such; cf. 
Artt. II, Registration Convention. 
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where the launching platform and control ship originally were licensed in Liberia – as a 
consequence, in other words, of the existence of ‘flags of convenience’ in the maritime 
sector! – already should provide a warning sign in this context. 
It is noteworthy, moreover, that the liability system is always a less direct route to 
enhancing safety than that of a priori certification and/or the imposition of other specific 
safety-related requirements and introduction of relevant standards – which are, so far, 
comprehensively lacking (with the aforementioned exceptions of the general clauses in 
the domestic Russian and Ukrainian statutes. 
Both these effects and the existing divergence itself moreover, will be further aggravated 
by the involvement of more and more states and more and more private operators in 
space activities. The larger the number of states which would become involved, the larger 
the chance that one of them will be tempted to ignore the arguments against cheapening 
one’s flag, will for short term gain be prepared to take some risk – and such ‘competition’ 
for business might then indeed drive down the standards. 
The risk of ‘flags of convenience’ on the horizon, though perhaps not immediately 
visible, is thus likely to increase or already increasing, which would then be further 
compounded by the legal complexities and inconsistencies stemming from the lack of 
commonly accepted definitions of such key concepts as “national activities”82 and 
“procur[ing] the launch of a space object”83.  
The first determines the scope of the attendant obligation to authorize and continuously 
supervise such activities if conducted by private actors – and as seen in the above, states 
have applied this to actors in a variety of combinations of territoriality, quasi-territoriality 
and nationality of the actors. The second has equally led to a rather large variety of level 
of involvement of states in the launch of a space object triggering appropriate licensing 
and the related liability reimbursement- and insurance-obligations.84  
The consequence of these uncertainties in the context of the present discussion might be 
in particular that states not yet having any national space law-cum-licensing system in 
place, in the absence of clear and more or less uniform guidance on how to precisely 
scope such regimes might not realise the importance of doing just that. Such precise 
scoping is important in order to, on the one hand, not leave any category of private space 
activities potentially giving rise to its liability being invoked on the international level 
uncovered by reimbursement and insurance obligations. On the other hand, it is important 
not cover more than is strictly necessary – as precisely such coverage may lead to victims 
considering the state in question to have accepted responsibility and/or liability, and to 
such considerations carrying the day in court or arbitral proceedings. 
From this perspective finally the arguments against concluding there is a need for 
addressing the issue of ‘flags of convenience’ – ‘there is not that much discrepancy 
amongst applicable licensing regimes, and none of them currently could be said to 
amount to a ‘cheap flag’’ – could also be viewed as arguments in favour of undertaking 
action in this context now. They would certainly sit well also with the fundamental 
                                                
82. Ref. Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty.  
83. Ref. Art. I(c), sub (i), Liability Convention.  
84. This issue has not been further analyzed in the present paper, but it may already be pointed out here that 
only three of the space acts discussed explicitly refer to ‘procurement’ of a launch as triggering the 
applicability of the respective licensing systems: the UK Outer Space Act (see Sec. 1(a)), the Hong Kong 
Outer Space Ordinance (see Sec. 3(a)) and the French Law on Space Operations (see Art. 2(3)). 
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premise that space activities “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries”, as required by Article I of the Outer Space Treaty and nowadays increasingly 
given shape through the concept of ‘sustainable development’: establishing an 
appropriate regime now could go a considerable way to ensuring that outer space will not 
be ‘wasted’ by commercial entrepreneurs operating under cheap flags in the future. 
Installing international rules precluding or at least minimising the appearance of ‘flags of 
convenience’ in outer space in the future is so much more feasible when there are no such 
flags yet – no vested interests would be harmed by the establishment of such a rule. On 
the contrary, the states so far behaving so responsibly as to create a licensing system 
would even have a vested interest in ensuring that others would not undercut such a 
system. The case of Antarctica – not accidentally a realm often compared legally with 
outer space – proves that this reasoning may well result in a high level of protection of 
general public interests in the area concerned. 
After all, with more and more states becoming involved in the opportunities for launching 
from a state different from one’s own, the risk of one of them being tempted to become a 
‘cheap flag’ also increases. Space debris is an issue high on the agenda these days, not 
likely to go away soon, and one important element of combating it lies in guaranteeing 
the safety of launches – principally through national space laws and licensing regimes. 
Properly ensuring that space activities would not be allowed to undercut the on-going and 
increasing efforts in this area for short-term gain would certainly require precluding 
‘flags of convenience’ ever to arise in outer space. 
In terms of substance in particular, harmonisation of national space laws and licensing 
regimes may not be feasible or practicable – and indeed, for example differences in 
domestic legal standards and approaches, differences between thinly populated potential 
launch areas such as Australia and more densely populated potential launch areas such as 
in the United States, differences between specific interests in promoting certain space 
activities as compared to others, and differences between legal systems in broad terms all 
are informing and will continue to inform the sovereign right of states to implement 
relevant international obligations accordingly. 
However, in tandem with a need to continue to undertake efforts to clarify the 
uncertainties surrounding the precise scope of some of those international obligations, a 
careful and well-considered approach to prevent future ‘flags of convenience’ from ever 
arising in outer space would be well worth the effort. In particular it is suggested to 
somehow include, at the international level, an ‘outer space version’ of the genuine link 
concept into international space law, starting out from simply copying and pasting the 
relevant clauses in the law of the sea conventions: “Each State shall fix the conditions for 
the grant of its registration to space objects. There must exist a genuine link between the 
State and the space object; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control over space objects registered by it.” Next, it might be considered 
to then add: “In doing so, the State shall in particular ensure due compliance by the 
operator of the registered space object – preferably by means of a system of 
authorisation, licensing and supervision – with the applicable rules of international 
space law.” After all, is it not always better and less costly to prevent rather than to cure? 
